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NOTE
DON’T TAKE ME OUT TO THAT BALLPARK:
STATE ACTION, GOVERNMENT SPEECH, AND
CHIEF WAHOO AFTER MATAL
Robert H. Hendricks†
Close your eyes and imagine yourself driving to a concert.
On the way, you pass a car bearing a license plate with the
image of a Confederate flag.  You pause, and ask . . . Did the
state approve that license plate?  Does the state endorse the
use of the Confederate flag? You keep driving.  Eventually you
reach the concert and walk in.  To your surprise, an Asian-
American band named “The Slants” is opening.  You pause,
and ask . . . I thought the government approves trademarks?
Does the Patent and Trademark Office endorse derogatory
slurs?  These questions strike at the heart of government
speech—a doctrine which allows the government to speak as
it pleases.  Why is a license plate government speech, but a
trademark not?  On what basis can a court distinguish be-
tween the two?  Given that government speech occurs outside
of First Amendment protections, the answer has profound im-
plications.  And that answer may come from left field.  The
Cleveland Indians’ controversial logo, Chief Wahoo, provides
the perfect context for explaining why a license plate is govern-
ment speech while a band’s trademark is not.  Before the
publication of this Note, the Indians announced that, starting
in 2019, they would remove Chief Wahoo from their jerseys.
Even though the removal is a step forward in respecting indig-
enous communities, Chief Wahoo will continue to appear on
team merchandise and will remain on the team’s jerseys for
† B.A., Cornell University, 2017; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2019; Managing
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 104.  I am grateful to my parents, Thomas and
Beth Hendricks, for their constant love, support, and inspiration.  In addition, I
am indebted to my fellow Cornell Law Review colleagues for their diligent editing
and support.  In particular, I would like to thank Susan Green Pado, Beatriz
Albornoz, Jenny Hu, Bryan Magee, Garrett Gerber, and Matthew Rowe.  I would
also like to thank Professor Michael Dorf and Professor Nelson Tebbe for their
insightful feedback.  Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to Emani Pollard
and Christopher Arce for their support and valuable observations.  While this
Note primarily offers principles on government speech and state action, I hope
this Note also serves as a humble acknowledgement of the role that I, as an ardent
lover of Cleveland sports, have played in the marginalization of indigenous
persons.
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the 2018 season.  This Note examines how Chief Wahoo’s
appearance in the publicly-owned Progressive Field may con-
stitute government speech.  To do so, this Note introduces ba-
sic principles for reconceptualizing government speech after
Matal—understanding government speech as a subset of
state action and thus applying state action tests to discern the
line between government speech and private speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Situated between the shore of Lake Erie (named after the
Erie tribe)1 and the bank of the Cuyahoga River (Iroquois trans-
lation: “crooked river”),2 Progressive Field sits as a bastion of
Cleveland pride.  It houses the beloved Cleveland Indians and
memorializes over a century of Clevelanders’ rapturous cheers
and cherished memories.  It also houses Chief Wahoo—a “dam-
aging” caricature representing an otherwise-treasured baseball
franchise.3  The logo depicts Chief Wahoo as having a cherry-
red face, protrusive nose, and native headdress.  Initially cre-
ated to “convey a spirit of pure joy and unbridled enthusiasm,”
Chief Wahoo has adorned Cleveland’s uniforms since 1951.4
1 Lake Erie, ERIE COUNTY, http://www.eriecounty.oh.gov/resources/kids-re
sources/erie-county/lake-erie/ [https://perma.cc/4NCP-5B7B].
2 Justin Glanville, A River Runs Through It, KENT ST. MAG. (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://www.kent.edu/magazine/news/river-runs-through-it [https://perma.cc
/H9XS-VX4J].
3 NCAI Applauds Major League Baseball and the Cleveland Franchise for
Retiring Offensive Chief Wahoo Logo, NCAI (Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter NCAI],
http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2018/01/29/ncai-applauds-major-league-
baseball-and-the-cleveland-franchise-for-retiring-offensive-chief-wahoo-logo
[https://perma.cc/WB8S-EEHE].
4 Tim Bannon, 10 Things to Know About the Cleveland Indians, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 25, 2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/baseball/ct-
10-things-indians-world-series-spt-1025-20161024-story.html [https://perma.
cc/LQT8-FHJB].  Cleveland has not won a World Series championship since plac-
ing Chief Wahoo on their uniforms.  They currently have the longest champion-
ship drought in professional baseball.
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Looking out from its perch on the team hat and jersey sleeve,
the logo “reduce[s] all Native people into a single outdated ster-
eotype that harms the way Native people, especially youth, view
themselves.”5
While the Indians slugged their way to a 12-0 rout of the
Baltimore Orioles, on June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court re-
leased its opinion in Matal v. Tam.  In an 8–0 decision, the
Court held that the government cannot deny registration to
disparaging trademarks.  Although the decision was a victory
for “The Slants,” a band which used the trademark to reclaim
and combat derogatory racial stereotypes, the decision was an
even bigger victory for the Indians and the Washington Red-
skins.  Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality opinion classified the
offensive trademark as private speech, not government speech.
Because the trademark was private speech, he concluded, the
government could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
Here, by invalidating The Slants’ trademark due to its offen-
siveness, the government engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.  This logic makes the Indians’ and Redskins’
trademarks essentially “open-and-shut” cases: because these
trademarks are private speech and the government cannot en-
gage in viewpoint discrimination, these trademarks will survive
post-Matal attacks.6
As demonstrated by the Indians’ recent decision to remove
Chief Wahoo from their jerseys, perhaps the best extra-legal
strategy remains exerting public pressure on the teams’ own-
ers.7  That said, even accepting Matal’s supposedly fatal hold-
ing and assuming that these disparaging trademarks
5 NCAI, supra note 3.  The nickname, “Indians,” also raises similar concerns. R
Imagine if the name were different, such as the Cleveland “Jews.”  The fact that
the latter sparks indignation but the former receives silent approval further dem-
onstrates how Chief Wahoo and the team’s nickname perpetuate a culture of
willful ignorance. See David Leonhardt, Cleveland’s Unthinking Racism, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/cleve
lands-unthinking-racism.html [https://perma.cc/J4CA-ZEDF].
6 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 F. App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2018)
(vacating district court order cancelling Redskins’ trademark registration).
7 The Redskins’s owner, Dan Snyder, remains opposed to any potential
changes:
I respect the opinions of those who disagree.  I want them to know
that I do hear them, and I will continue to listen and learn.  But we
cannot ignore our 81 year history, or the strong feelings of most of
our fans as well as Native Americans throughout the country.  After
81 years, the team name “Redskins” continues to hold the memories
and meaning of where we came from, who we are, and who we want
to be in the years to come.
We are Redskins Nation and we owe it to our fans and coaches
and players, past and present, to preserve that heritage.
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(hereinafter referred to as “Marks”) are valid trademarks, some
small cracks in speech law remain open for activists to attack
Chief Wahoo and the like.
Exposing one of these cracks, one can argue that because
Progressive Field and FedEx Field (the Redskins’ stadium) are
publicly funded,8 the Marks displayed in these stadiums con-
stitute government speech.  If the Marks are construed as gov-
ernment speech, the government may discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint and remove the Marks from display in these
stadiums.  To determine whether the government is in fact
speaking, one must reconcile the recent Matal decision with
previous government speech doctrine.  Because the govern-
ment might speak through a private entity, discerning the line
between government speech (which the government can re-
strict on the basis of viewpoint) and private speech (which the
government cannot restrict on the basis of viewpoint) is crucial.
Although current government speech doctrine makes this line
difficult to discern, this Note seeks to offer principles and ex-
amples for how state action can clarify the scope of government
speech.
Previous articles have analyzed the intersection between
free speech and sports facilities in depth.9  In the context of fan
free speech, the First Amendment applies with the most force
when a private club is deemed a state actor.  Because a pub-
licly-owned stadium is likely a public or limited public forum,
Dan Snyder, Letter from Washington Redskins Owner Dan Snyder to Fans, WASH.
POST (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/letter-from-washing
ton-redskins-owner-dan-snyder-to-fans/2013/10/09/e7670ba0-30fe-11e3-
8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html?utm_term=.3a3078480b1e [perma.cc/4EJY-
PTEK].
8 Progressive Field (formerly named “Jacobs Field” after the team’s former
owner Dick Jacobs) is a stronger case study for the offensive Marks as government
speech.  The local government owns the stadium and taxpayers funded 48% of its
construction.  Case W. Reserve Univ., Progressive Field, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVE-
LAND HIST. [hereinafter Progressive Field], https://case.edu/ech/articles/p/pro
gressive-field/ [https://perma.cc/J8EC-G6PM].
Meanwhile, Dan Snyder owns FedEx Field and the stadium was predomi-
nantly built on private financing (although taxpayers did contribute over $70
million).  Nonetheless, Snyder is seeking massive taxpayer aid to build a new
stadium by 2027.  Tyler Foote, Virginia Should Pass on a Taxpayer-Funded Red-
skins Stadium, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/virginia-should-pass-on-a-taxpayer-funded-redskins-stadium/2016/
09/02/35c391e8-6ee5-11e6-9705-23e51a2f424d_story.html?utm_term=.3c11
27e13d90 [perma.cc/N773-JUEL].
9 See Nick DeSiato, Silencing the Crowd: Regulating Free Speech in Profes-
sional Sports Facilities, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 411, 420 (2010); Howard M.
Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 525, 544 (2006).
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the First Amendment will protect fans from the state actor’s
speech restrictions when these restrictions discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint.  For example, a club could not create a
policy preventing fans from rooting against the home team.  If a
private club is not deemed a state actor, then fans are at the
mercy of the club’s speech restrictions, even if they discrimi-
nate on the basis of viewpoint.10
Using these lessons from the fan free speech context, this
Note seeks to embark into uncharted territory.  Rather than
asking to what extent the First Amendment protects fans from
a private club’s speech restrictions in a publicly funded sta-
dium, this Note asks to what extent the First Amendment pro-
tects a private club, who plays in a publicly funded stadium,
from government speech restrictions.  The answer is simple—if
the government is speaking, then the government may speak,
or restrict its speech, as it pleases.  The path to this “govern-
ment speech” answer is less simple.  To better discern the line
between government speech and private speech, this Note
looks to a different legal universe—state action.  Just like
Texas’s decision to disassociate itself from Confederate license
plates, a government will want to disassociate itself from a
private actor’s controversial speech when that private actor
bears a close relationship to the government.  Because the
most difficult government speech cases arise when a govern-
ment seeks to disassociate itself from private speech, state ac-
tion is useful insofar as it shows which private actors indeed
bear a close relationship to the government.
In the wake of Matal, this Note proposes principles for un-
derstanding how state action can aid in discerning the differ-
ence between government speech and private speech.  In doing
so, this Note examines how activists can leverage government
speech to pressure the removal of harmful messages.  Part I
describes the history of the Indians’ team name and Chief Wa-
hoo.  By providing this necessary factual background, Part I
demonstrates why a government may value the ability to disas-
sociate itself from controversial speech.
Part II analyzes recent court decisions in the government
speech arena.  In particular, Part II attempts to reconcile the
holdings of Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veter-
ans and Matal v. Tam.  To reconcile these holdings, Part II
10 Of course, social and financial pressure would restrain a team owner from
implementing onerous speech restrictions.  For example, if Dallas Cowboys owner
Jerry Jones created a policy ejecting fans for sitting through the National Anthem,
fans could protest by spending their money elsewhere.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 6 20-NOV-18 13:36
1594 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1589
provides the principles behind government speech and state
action and proposes anchoring the former to the principles of
the latter.  In particular, this Note uses a “relationship” analy-
sis, the touchstone of state action, to discern the line between
when the government is speaking and when a private entity is
speaking.
Part III provides an in-depth look at how state action prin-
ciples can provide guidance in drawing the line between when
the government is speaking, and when a private entity is
speaking.  To do so, Part III returns to the Cleveland Indians
and comprehensively examines the relationship between the
Indians and the City of Cleveland.  In doing so, this Note lays
the groundwork for why the display of these Marks in stadiums
constitutes state action, and thus government speech.  If the
display of these Marks does not constitute state action, then
the display is purely the private club’s private speech, and the
government cannot restrict it.  If the display constitutes state
action, then we must discern how the government speaks
through the private “state actor.”
I
BRIEF HISTORY OF CHIEF WAHOO AND
THE CLEVELAND INDIANS
In 1871, Louis Francis Sockalexis was born in Maine on
the Penobscot Indian Reservation.11  His legend began during
his days as a centerfielder for the College of the Holy Cross.12
In a game against Harvard University, he reportedly threw a
ball from the wall to home plate on the fly.13  The throw became
known as the “Lightning Throw” and Harvard professors mea-
sured it at 414 feet long.14  Sockalexis and his golden arm soon
made it to the big leagues.15  In 1897, he debuted for the Cleve-
land Spiders, becoming the first Native American to play pro-
fessional baseball.16  Between newspapers describing him as a
11 Joe Posnanski, The Cleveland Indians, Louis Sockalexis, and The Name,
NBC SPORTS (Mar. 18, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://mlb.nbcsports.com/2014/03/18/
the-cleveland-indians-louis-sockalexis-and-the-name/ [https://perma.cc/7W97-
YH2J] (compiling one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Cleveland Indi-
ans’s logo and name).  Posnanski, who opposes the logo, concludes that the his-
tory is not necessarily clear. Id.  On the one hand, the team name and logo were
clearly not intended to honor Sockalexis.  On the other hand, the team’s account
of the name and logo’s inception is not entirely fabricated either. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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“noble savage,” “redskin,” and “educated Indian,” and fans jeer-
ing him with references to collecting scalps, Sockalexis faced
relentless racism.17  After a brief, three-year tenure in Cleve-
land, he was released from the team.18
Over the course of the next fifteen years, Cleveland’s vari-
ous team names included the Spiders, Bronchos, Blues, Exiles,
Castoffs, Misfits, Molly McGuires, and the Naps (named after
Cleveland legend Napoleon Lajoie).19  After a horrendous 1914
season, Cleveland released Lajoie and needed another team
name.20  In search of a new team name, team owner Charles
Somers held a fan team-naming contest and brought together a
group of Cleveland sportswriters to suggest ideas.21  The re-
sult?  The Cleveland “Indians.”  Although the team maintains
that the name is meant to honor Sockalexis, the evidence
weighs against that conclusion.22  During the entire year of
1915, only one newspaper story made mention of Sockalexis.23
Two other reasons appear more convincing.  First, the Boston
“Braves” won the pennant in 1914 and had popularized Native
American nicknames.24  Second, the new nickname allowed
17 Id.; see also Joe Posnanski, Cleveland Indians: The Name, JOE BLOGS (Mar.
18, 2014), http://joeposnanski.com/cleveland-indians-the-name/ [https://
perma.cc/V6NJ-5ZPP] (“There was hardly a mention of Sockalexis that did not
include some reference to collecting scalps or wampum or General Custer or, in
later coverage, firewater.  War whoops followed him everywhere.  The favorable
stories usually involved some sort of bizarre Indian tale.”).
18 Posnanski, supra note 11. R
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Peter Pattakos, The Curse of Chief Wahoo: Are We Paying the Price for
Embracing America’s Last Acceptable Racist Symbol?, CLEVELAND SCENE (Apr. 25,
2012), https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/the-curse-of-chief-wahoo/Con
tent?mode=read&oid=2954423 [perma.cc/MWV5-N5LY].
23 See Joe Posnanski, Sockalexis Addendum, JOE BLOGS (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://joeposnanski.com/sockalexis-addendum/ [https://perma.cc/V6NJ-
5ZPP] (“I mentioned in my story about Louis Sockalexis and the naming of the
Indians that I could not find Sockalexis named a single time in the 1915 newspa-
pers I searched.  That included more than 300 papers around the country . . . . As
it turns out, my search engine did not include the Cleveland Plain Dealer.  In an
editorial on the day after the team was named Indians, it turns out that Sock-
alexis very specifically was mentioned in an editorial under a headline ‘Looking
Backward.’”).  Despite conceding that a connection may exist between the team
name and Sockalexis, Posnanski concludes that the team name was in no way
meant to honor Sockalexis.  He suggests that although intrigued fans excited by
Sockalexis’s arrival referred to the 1897 team as the “Indians,” this unofficial
1897 team name was at best one reason (among others) for the 1915 name
change.  In other words, though Sockalexis may have had something to do with
the name change, the team is wrong insofar as it suggests that the name change
was meant to honor him. Id.
24 Posnanski, supra note 11. R
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fans and writers alike to engage in stereotypical chants and
commentary when attending games or describing the team’s
play.25
In 1932, the next chapter in the team name’s story began
when a newspaper cartoonist introduced a caricature of a Na-
tive American in the Cleveland Plain Dealer.26  “The Little In-
dian” quickly became popular and was a regular feature in the
newspaper’s coverage of the team.27  “In a way, it was an earlier
version of an emoji.  His image popped up throughout the
sports pages and was used to express feelings of happiness
during winning streaks or dismay during rainouts.”28  In 1947,
Indians owner Bill Veeck sought to adopt “The Little Indian,” or
“Chief Wahoo” as fans came to call the cartoon, as the team
logo.29  By 1951, when the team placed Chief Wahoo on its
jersey, the logo settled into its current form—a red face, with
exaggerated facial features and a red feather sticking out of a
black headdress.30  Despite small, technical changes (such as
the color of the logo’s outlining), the logo has remained a con-
stant in Cleveland sports.  Only recently, the team yielded to
pressure from Major League Baseball (MLB) to remove Chief
Wahoo from the team’s jerseys starting in 2019.31  Nonethe-
less, Chief Wahoo will continue to appear on team merchandise
and will remain on the team’s jerseys for the 2018 season.32
25 Id.  For example, fans regularly “whoop” during home games.
26 Chris Chavez, How Chief Wahoo Has Evolved over Time, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.si.com/mlb/2016/10/27/chief-wahoo-cleveland-
indians-mascot-history [https://perma.cc/CG69-QCUY].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Camila Domonoske, Cleveland Indians Will Remove ‘Chief Wahoo’ From
Uniforms In 2019, NPR (Jan. 29, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2018/01/29/581590453/cleveland-indians-will-remove-chief-wa
hoo-from-uniforms-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/GH7K-9AMS].
32 Id. The decision to remove Chief Wahoo has sparked heightened tensions
between those advocating and those decrying its removal.  The heightened ten-
sions have centered on the morality of the logo and on future implications—such
as changing the team name. See Matt Stevens & David Waldstein, As Cleveland
Indians Prepare to Part with Chief Wahoo, Tensions Reignite, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/sports/baseball/cleveland-indi-
ans-chief-wahoo-protests.html [https://perma.cc/JH6F-5JCB].  Unfortunately
(but not surprisingly), the backlash surrounding the removal has revealed much
of the racism and ignorance that inspired the logo in the first place. Id. (“In
response [to an anti-Chief Wahoo protest at Opening Day], some fans walking to
the stadium hurled profanity-laced tirades at the protesters, along with ugly
names and obscene gestures.  ‘Get a job,’ one fan yelled, along with an expletive.
‘Get a grip,’ shouted another.  Several flaunted team jackets, jerseys and caps
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II
RECONCILING WALKER33 AND MATAL34
The First Amendment serves as a barrier to government
attempts to restrict speech.35  The government may only re-
strict speech that falls within an unprotected category of
speech: political advocacy as incitement,36 libel,37 defama-
tion,38 fighting words,39 obscenity,40 child pornography,41
threats,42 and speech owned by others.43  For the purposes of
this Note, what is important here is what is not included in the
list of unprotected speech categories—speech that stereotypes
or discriminates on the basis of race.44  This exclusion follows
from the long-standing free speech tradition that the solution
to undesired speech is more speech, not censored speech.45
However, First Amendment protections shift when the govern-
ment is speaking or restricting its own speech.  This is “govern-
ment speech.”  If the government is speaking, then the
government may speak however it pleases so long as it does not
violate the Establishment Clause.46  If the government is re-
stricting its own speech, perhaps that of a government agency,
then the government may discriminate on the basis of view-
point.47  For example, the government may issue pamphlets
emblazoned with the Chief Wahoo logo.  One fan made whooping noises as she
walked by.”).
33 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239
(2015).
34 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
38 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
40 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
41 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
42 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
43 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
44 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“Speech that demeans on
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar
ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that
we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” (quoting United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
45 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”).
46 See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 650
(2013) (arguing that the government is restricted not only by the Establishment
Clause, but also by a constitutional principle of “nonendorsement” towards ideas
that “abridge[ ] full and equal citizenship”).
47 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). Compare
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
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and posters encouraging the war effort in World War II without
having to also issue pamphlets and posters discouraging war.48
First gaining prominence after the 1991 Supreme Court
decision in Rust v. Sullivan, “government speech” is a doctrine
that allows the government to speak without First Amendment
constraints.  In other words, the government may speak, and
restrict its own speech, however it pleases.49  In Rust, recipi-
ents of Title X funding brought suit challenging the govern-
ment’s prohibition on “abortion-related activities.”50  Writing
for a five-justice majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
explained:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, se-
lectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.51
In other words, “when Congress established a National Endow-
ment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt
democratic principles, . . . it was not constitutionally required
to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.”52
In 2009, the Supreme Court took another step in address-
ing the line between government speech and private speech.  In
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court asked whether ad-
herents of the Summum religion could force Pleasant Grove
City to place a privately-funded monument in a public park,
alongside fifteen other permanent monuments.53  The Supreme
(1993) (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways
that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”) (quoting City
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)), with Matal,
137 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on govern-
ment speech would be paralyzing.  When a government entity embarks on a
course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others.
The Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint neu-
trality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.”).
48 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
49 Id.
50 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991).
51 Id. at 193.
52 Id. at 194.
53 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009) (“This case
presents the question whether the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
entitles a private group to insist that a municipality permit it to place a permanent
monument in a city park in which other donated monuments were previously
erected.”). Id. at 464.  Among these other monuments, eleven of which were
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Court held that they could not.  Rather than designating the
park as a public forum for private speech, Justice Samuel Alito,
writing for the Court, found that the city was engaging in its
own speech.54  “There may be situations in which it is difficult
to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own
behalf or is providing a forum for private speech, but this case
does not present such a situation.”55  With the Court adopting
Justice Alito’s government speech doctrine, the table was set
for Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.56
On June 18, 2015, the Supreme Court released its opinion
in Walker.  The case involved a First Amendment challenge to
the denial of a specialty license plate that included an image of
the Confederate flag.57  In a majority opinion written by Justice
Stephen Breyer, the Court held that license plates are govern-
ment speech and therefore, the government can regulate li-
cense plate messages on the basis of viewpoint.58  Relying on
the Court’s previous holding in Summum, Justice Breyer used
three factors in his analysis: (1) whether the government had
long used license plates to speak to the public; (2) whether a
reasonable observer would believe that the government was
conveying a message through a specialty license plate; and (3)
whether the government maintained control over the selection
of specialty license plates.59
The Court first found that Texas had selected messages it
intended to communicate on its license plate designs since
1919.60  For example, Texas has displayed a “Lone Star” em-
blem, a silhouette of the state, and various messages including
“150 Years of Statehood,” “Read to Succeed,” “Houston Live-
stock Show and Rodeo,” “Texans Conquer Cancer,” and “Girl
Scouts.”61  Second, the Court found that the “Texas license
plate designs ‘are often closely identified in the public mind
with the [State].’”62  According to the Court, a Texas license
plate is a form of government ID.63  Additionally, the Court
privately donated, were a September 11 memorial and a Ten Commandments
monument. Id. at 465.
54 Id. at 469–70.
55 Id. at 470.
56 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
57 Id. at 2243–44.
58 Id. at 2246.
59 Id. at 2247.
60 Id. at 2248.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2242 (alteration in original) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
63 Id. at 2249.
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noted that as the issuer of an ID, Texas would not want to
permit the placement of “a message with which [it would] not
wish to be associated.”64  The Court also expressed concern
that “a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate
likely intends to convey to the public that [Texas] has endorsed
that message.”65  Lastly, the Court found that Texas main-
tained direct control over the messages that the specialty plates
conveyed.66
In so finding, the Court declined to perform a public forum
analysis because the fact that private parties helped design the
specialty plates did not erase the messages that the govern-
ment meant to convey through the license plates.67  Rather, the
Court explained that the license-plate-message-selection pro-
cess was a necessary one for the government.  If Texas could
not select its own messages, it would likely need to shut down
specialty license plates altogether.  Otherwise, Texas would be
forced to issue plates “promoting al Qaeda” every time it ap-
proved a plate stating, “Fight Terrorism.”68
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the license plates
served as limited public forums for private expression.  Like
Justice Breyer, Justice Alito also identified three factors from
Summum that applied to the case: (1) whether the government
had long used license plates to speak to the public; (2) whether
Texas had a history of selectivity in selecting license plate de-
signs; and (3) whether the license plates presented spatial limi-
tations on the number of designs that Texas could
accommodate.69  First, Justice Alito noted that specialty li-
cense plates, on which motorists could choose which messages
they want to convey, were not available in Texas until 1991.70
64 Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)).
“[P]ersons who observe [designs on IDs] routinely—and reasonably—interpret
them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.” Id.
65 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (“If not, the individual could simply display the
message in question in larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate.
But the individual prefers a license plate design to the purely private speech
expressed through bumper stickers.  That may well be because Texas’s license
plate designs convey government agreement with the message displayed.”).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2251 (“In this case, as in Summum, the ‘government entity may
exercise [its] freedom to express its views’ even ‘when it receives assistance from
private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.’”
(quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009))).
68 Id. at 2249 (“Texas offers plates that pay tribute to the Texas citrus indus-
try.  But it need not issue plates praising Florida’s oranges as far better.” (citation
omitted)).
69 Id. at 2258–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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In other words, he noted that no long history of government
speech on Texas license plates existed.71  Second, he chal-
lenged the selectivity that Texas applied to its specialty plate
program.72  He noted that, by design, the program is not selec-
tive.73  Rather, the program is designed to encourage more de-
signs and generate additional revenue for the state.74  Lastly,
Justice Alito explained that Texas has infinite space, unlike the
park in Summum, to approve as many license plates as it
desires:75
Texas has space available on millions of little mobile bill-
boards.  And Texas, in effect, sells that space to those who
wish to use it to express a personal message—provided only
that the message does not express a viewpoint that the State
finds unacceptable.  That is not government speech; it is the
regulation of private speech.76
In the wake of Walker, lower courts began applying the
government speech doctrine to speech that seemingly came
from both a government speaker and a private speaker.77
Then, almost two years after Walker, the Supreme Court re-
leased its decision in Matal v. Tam.  In an 8–0 decision, the
Court refused to extend Walker and the government speech
doctrine any further, holding that the Lanham Act’s prohibition
on disparaging trademarks violated the First Amendment.78
“The Slants,” a band led by Simon Tam, chose its band name in
an effort to reclaim stereotypes typically targeted towards peo-
ple of Asian ethnicity.79  After the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) rejected the registration for the band’s name, Tam
brought suit under the First Amendment.80  Writing for the
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting).
77 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074–79  (11th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016) (allowing a school district to remove a
paid business advertisement posted on a school fence because the owner of the
advertisement previously performed in pornographic films); Vista-Graphics, Inc.
v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 477 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that
private businesses’ advertisement materials located in Virginia’s highway wel-
come centers constituted government speech).
78 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
79 Id. at 1754.
80 Id.
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Court, Justice Alito found that the trademarks constituted pri-
vate speech, not government speech.81  The Court noted:
[I]t is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered
mark is government speech.  If the federal registration of a
trademark makes the mark government speech, the Federal
Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently.  It is
saying many unseemly things.  It is expressing contradictory
views.  It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commer-
cial products and services.  And it is providing Delphic advice
to the consuming public.82
Finally, the Court took one last jab at the government
speech doctrine, dismissing any semblance that trademarks
hold to previous instances of government speech:
In sum, the federal registration of trademarks is vastly differ-
ent from the beef ads in Johanns, the monuments in Sum-
mum, and even the specialty license plates in Walker . . . .
Perhaps the most worrisome implication of the Government’s
argument concerns the system of copyright registration.  If
federal registration makes a trademark government speech
and thus eliminates all First Amendment protection, would
the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar
transformation?83
Because the trademarks constituted private speech, the court
held that the government could not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint, and therefore, the Lanham Act prohibition violated
the First Amendment.
In attempting to reconcile Walker and Matal, understand-
ing the nexus between state action and government speech will
prove important.  Several constitutional amendments, includ-
ing the First Amendment, are phrased as restrictions on gov-
ernment, or “state,” action.84  As such, to allege a violation of
these amendments, a plaintiff must prove that the government
was responsible.85  In other words, “courts ask whether the
81 Id. at 1758 (“The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and
it does not edit marks submitted for registration.”).
82 Id. (footnote and citation omitted).  Justice Samuel Alito wasn’t finished
just yet.  He continued: “For example, if trademarks represent government
speech, what does the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to
‘make.believe’ (Sony), ‘Think different’ (Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your
way’ (Burger King)?  Was the government warning about a coming disaster when it
registered the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?” Id. at 1759 (footnotes omitted).
83 Id. at 1760.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .” (emphasis added)).
85 See Stephen K. Wirth, Note, State Action, Government Speech, and the
Narrowing Spectrum of Private, Protected Speech, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 485, 485
(2014).
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ultimate decisionmaker [behind the unlawful action] was a gov-
ernment officer or whether the action should be attributed to
the government for some other reason.”86  The state action re-
quirement marks “the boundary between public and private
spheres in a world of overlapping interests and roles.”87  In
doing so, it restrains the government from encroaching on indi-
vidual liberty and promotes federalism values.88  In applica-
tion, the state action requirement is an oft-criticized, confusing
puzzle that often protects the politically-powerful from the po-
litically-powerless.89  Put bluntly, “the field is a conceptual dis-
aster area.”90  Despite its conceptual confusion, the state
action requirement exists to define “public and private
spheres”—a useful proxy for better defining the relationship
between the government and a private speaker in the govern-
ment speech context.
In some ways, state action and government speech operate
on different planes:
[T]he Court declines to extend First Amendment protection to
speech that is censored by a third party by claiming that
there has been no state action, yet it invokes a seemingly
opposite rationale—claiming that certain private speech is in
fact government speech—to deny, once again, First Amend-
ment protection.91
These doctrines diverge in other ways too.  For example, state
action imputes the power of the state to a private individual or
business for the purpose of preventing private discrimination,
whereas government speech allows the government to speak
for itself without regard to the usual First Amendment restric-
tions.92  Whereas state action restrains the government in its
regulatory capacity, government speech empowers the govern-
ment in its proprietary capacity.  In other words, state action
draws the line between whether a government or private actor
is violating an individual’s rights; meanwhile, government
speech draws the line between whether the government is reg-
86 John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83
N.C. L. REV. 569, 578 (2005).  For examples of when a court may impute state
action to otherwise private conduct, see infra Part III.
87 Fee, supra note 86, at 572. R
88 See id. at 575–76 (suggesting that the state action requirement prevents
Congress from legislating private conduct and therein preserves a space for states
to legislate).
89 See id. at 576.
90 Id. (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protec-
tion, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967)).
91 Wirth, supra note 85, at 498. R
92 Id. at 485–86.
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ulating or speaking.  Further, a plaintiff must prove state ac-
tion in asserting a First Amendment violation, whereas a
government raises government speech as a defense to a First
Amendment claim.93
Despite operating on different planes in certain contexts,
these doctrines still converge because they sprout from the
structure of the First Amendment and exist as fundamental
necessities for the government in promoting its policies.
“[G]overnment speech is one of the means that the government
can employ to achieve a desired policy.  Government speech is
a form of state action.”94 Naturally, one could argue that rais-
ing taxes is also a fundamental necessity for the government in
promoting its policies.  Does that mean a court should import
tax doctrine into government speech doctrine? Of course not.
While taxing surely is a fundamental necessity for the govern-
ment, the government’s ability to tax emerges from Congress’
taxing power and states’ reserved powers.  In contrast, the
structure of the First Amendment gives rise to state action and
government speech.  In other words, tax doctrine’s source is
conceptually different than the First Amendment.  The taxing
power is an affirmative authorization of government action;
meanwhile, the First Amendment defines the space of individ-
ual liberty that ought to be free from government intrusion.
State action and government speech doctrines serve to clarify
where the individual’s liberty ends, and the government’s inter-
ests begin.
In the context of mixed speech, in which one cannot defini-
tively tell whether the government or a private actor is speak-
ing,95 state action doctrine may aid in determining who is
93 Id. at 494.
94 Id. at 501.
95 See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expres-
sion’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588–89 (2008) (“A growing body of First
Amendment litigation involves private parties who seek to alter or join what the
government contends is its own expression.  These disputes involve competing
claims to the same speech: a private speaker maintains that a communication
reflects (or should be allowed to reflect) her own views, while a governmental body
characterizes that expression as its own, along with the ability to control its
content.  Examples include Tennessee’s decision to issue a ‘Choose Life’ specialty
license plate while rejecting the ACLU’s proposed ‘Pro-Choice’ plate, Missouri’s
refusal to acknowledge the Ku Klux Klan on state Adopt-a-Highway signs, and a
public school district’s rejection of advocates’ requests to post pro-voucher mater-
ials on the district’s webpage conveying the school board’s opposition to voucher
legislation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech Is Both Private and Government, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2008)
(arguing that speech usually is neither purely private nor governmental, but
mixed and best conceptualized as a question of degree).
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speaking.  For example, the state action doctrines of symbiotic
relationship and entwinement could help a court in determin-
ing the extent to which the Cleveland Indians’ speech is govern-
ment speech.  State action provides a logical outer boundary
for the expansion of government speech.  Because government
speech is a form of state action and thus cannot exist without
state action, a logical conclusion is that the government speech
doctrine should anchor itself to state action doctrine.  Rather
than crafting a three-factor analysis, as Justice Breyer em-
ployed in Walker,96 or using a reasonable observer test, as
Justice David Souter suggested in his concurrence Summum,97
the Court should use state action principles as a proxy for
determining when the government is actually speaking.  Inso-
far as state action determines the extent to which a seemingly
private individual or business acts on behalf of the govern-
ment, it can also help a court determine the extent to which
that same individual or business speaks on behalf of the gov-
ernment.  In anchoring government speech only to places
where a state actor is speaking, a court can rest assured know-
ing that the government may advance its goals without forcing
private individuals and businesses to serve as government
messengers for those goals.
In response, one could question whether importing state
action doctrine into government speech doctrine actually is a
logical conclusion.  Whereas state action doctrine determines
whether the government or a private actor is regulating, gov-
ernment speech doctrine determines whether the government
is regulating or speaking.  At first glance, the two doctrines
appear similar, yet not equivalent.  One answer to this criticism
is to reconceptualize the criticism.  If the government is regu-
lating speech, it is not speaking.  It is regulating a private ac-
tor’s speech.  Thus, government speech doctrine is really
asking whether the government is regulating a private actor’s
speech or speaking itself.  This is simply another way of saying
that government speech doctrine determines whether the gov-
ernment or a private actor is speaking.  Designed to analyze the
nexus between the government and a private actor, state action
doctrine is best suited to draw this line.
96 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2247 (2015).
97 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 485–87 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the Court employ a reasonable observer test so as to
cohere with Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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In the “public property, private lease” state action sphere,
the key analysis focuses on the relationship between the public
and private entities.  In other words, courts examine how close
the nexus is between the government and the private actor—
considerations include “whether there is an interdependent re-
lationship between [them] . . . [or] whether government officials
are entangled in the management or control of a private en-
tity.”98  In the same way, the government speech doctrine, es-
pecially where the distinction between government speech and
private speech is blurred, should focus on the nature of the
relationship between the government and the private entity
through which it attempts to speak.  Using a state action-like
“relationship” analysis can help distinguish Walker and its
progeny from Matal.
On the one hand, in Walker, Texas and the Sons of the
Confederate Veterans (SCV) had more than a passing relation-
ship.  If Texas had approved the SCV’s license plate, its rela-
tionship with SCV would not have ended there.  Rather, the
license plate design would have memorialized the relationship
between Texas and the SCV, and the license plate would have
announced that relationship wherever the car carrying the li-
cense plate went.99  In this way, Texas could be understood to
agree “directly with the aims, activities and policies” of the SCV;
or, more plausibly, Texas “could be understood to legitimate
the [SCV] through its endorsement, not necessarily sharing the
[SCV’s] policies or prior history but attesting to its rehabilita-
tion in a new form.”100
While Texas speaks on many seemingly trivial things
through its specialty license plates, it places implicit endorse-
ment behind the diverse culture and spirit that each plate
98 Fee, supra note 86, at 584–85 (compiling cases that apply these nexus R
considerations to state action questions).
99 In its brief, Texas argued that the relationship between the government and
a license plate applicant is similar to the relationship between a NASCAR driver
and his sponsors:
[T]he driver is publicly placing his name and reputation behind the
messages, products, and corporations that appear on that uniform.
Those advertisements are undoubtedly the ‘speech’ of the NASCAR
driver.  One cannot acknowledge this and simultaneously deny that
the State’s decision to exclude the confederate battle flag from its
state-issued license plates involves government speech.
Brief for the Petitioner at 26, Walker,135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144).
100 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1477 (2001) (describing a state’s interest in disas-
sociating from the Ku Klux Klan).
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evokes.101  When all the plates are seen together, they re-
present a tapestry of Texan pride.  As such, Texas enters into a
relationship with each specialty license plate customer, ensur-
ing that each relationship plays a role in advancing Texan
pride.102  In reality, Texas’s interest is not necessarily focused
on making sure each license plate represents Texas pride;
rather, Texas’s interest is focused on disassociating from a li-
cense plate that does not properly represent Texas.103
On the other hand, in Matal, the PTO and Simon Tam had
no more than a passing relationship and as a result, the PTO
had a lesser disassociation interest than Texas.  The PTO had
no relationship with “The Slants” trademark beyond ensuring
trademark protection.  Rather than making value-laden deci-
sions, the PTO is tasked with making value-neutral deci-
sions.104  Unlike Texas, the PTO does not think through how
each trademark would create a tapestry of American pride or
advance American ingenuity.105  As such, the PTO does not
need to enter into anything more than a formal relationship
with its applicants.  Whereas Texas reaps benefits of civic pride
101 “The State retains absolute editorial control over the content of those
plates, and the panoply of specialty plates reflects not the absence of editorial
control, but rather the diverse array of Texans’ educational backgrounds, inter-
ests, and points of pride that the State is willing to showcase.”  Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 99, at 23. R
102 One could scarcely imagine Texas approving a plate that said, “Texas
stinks!”  Put differently, Texas is sending “a message about the things they want
to celebrate about [its] state and citizens—be that education, sports, recreation,
civic organizations, military service, arts, environmental issues, and the list goes
on.”  Scott W. Gaylord, “Kill the Sea Turtles” and Other Things You Can’t Make the
Government Say, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 149 (2014).  A state could showcase
its citizens through creative ways.  For example, while some might say that Texas
approving an Oklahoma Sooners’s plate undermines the purpose of promoting
Texan pride, one could see the Oklahoma plate as showcasing Texans’ diverse
educational experiences. See id. at 149–50.
103 See Michael Dorf, The Slants, Government Speech, and Elane Photography,
DORF ON L. (June 22, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/the-slants-gov
ernment-speech-and-elane.html [perma.cc/7XZE-C8ZX]; see also Norton, supra
note 95, at 592 (“Not only does such misattribution mislead the public about its R
government’s actual values, but those views may carry greater persuasive force
than they would otherwise enjoy because a message’s source can—and often
does—change its reception.  This dynamic threatens to skew the public debate
and inhibit informed self-governance by misleading onlookers into evaluating
ideas differently than they would if those views were accurately assigned to a
private party.”).
104 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).
105 One could easily imagine the PTO approving a trademark that said,
“America stinks!”  Likewise, the PTO shows little interest in promoting a message
of American pride when it approves trademarks such as “Take Yo Panties Off,”
“Capitalism Sucks Donkey Balls,” and “Murder 4 Hire.”  Brief for the Respondent
at 28, Matal, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (15-1293).
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and unity from its plates, in addition to generating revenue, the
PTO only generates revenue from trademark registrations.
The Cleveland Indians provide a perfect opportunity to fur-
ther examine the benefits of a government speech analysis
grounded in state action principles.  Because state action doc-
trine is rooted in a “relationship” analysis, analyzing whether
the Indians are a state actor allows one to see how the Indians’
relationship with Cleveland advances the government’s goals.
In other words, determining the nature of their relationship will
shed light on whether the government uses the Indians as a
conduit for government speech.  In turn, this allows one to see
how the relationship between the Indians and Cleveland is
more akin to the relationship between Texas and license plate
designers than it is to the relationship between the PTO and
trademark applicants.  If the Indians, by virtue of their stadium
lease with Cleveland, are state actors, they speak on behalf of
the government when they speak in accordance with their state
activity.  For example, if the Indians’ operation of stadium dis-
plays constitutes state action, then the Indians speak on behalf
of the government when they speak through the logos they
place throughout the stadium.106  We turn to state action doc-
trine to determine the nature of the relationship between the
Indians and Cleveland.
III
THE GOVERNMENT LEASE OF A PUBLICLY-FUNDED
BALLPARK TO A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAM
CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION
The state action doctrine stands at the gate for most First
Amendment claims.  In the context of sports stadiums, courts
typically apply three tests: symbiotic relationship, entwine-
ment, and public function.107  So long as one test is satisfied, a
court will find that state action exists.  In applying these tests,
courts rely heavily on the unique factual circumstances sur-
106 See  Norton, supra note 95, at 608 (“[U]nattended displays on government R
property enhance the possibility of misattribution.  While an observer watching an
individual speak in a public forum tends to attribute the speech to the speaker,
one observing an unattended display (and any message it conveys) tends to attri-
bute the display to the owner of the land on which it stands.” (internal quotations
and footnotes omitted)).
107 The Indians likely are not a state actor under the public function test
because operating stadium displays is not a public function (such as managing a
sidewalk) that a public entity would typically perform. See United Church of
Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 455
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding state action where owners of Progressive Field managed
sidewalk outside the stadium).
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rounding the relationship between the government and the pri-
vate club.  Here, we examine how the symbiotic relationship
and entwinement tests apply to Progressive Field.
A. Symbiotic Relationship
In applying the symbiotic relationship test, a court asks
whether both the government and the private club both receive
benefits as a result of their relationship.  The district court in
Ludtke v. Kuhn directly examined the symbiotic relationship
test.108  In Ludtke, a female sports reporter sought to enjoin a
MLB policy that excluded female sports reporters from entering
teams’ locker rooms.109  According to the court, the key inquiry
in finding state action was “whether New York City’s involve-
ment with Yankee Stadium and the lease arrangement with the
Yankees is such as to make the Kuhn policy determination
state action . . . .”110 Although the discrimination took place on
“ostensibly private premises (the Yankee Clubhouse),” the
Yankees Clubhouse was located in old Yankee Stadium, which
New York City leased to the Yankees.111  In finding a symbiotic
relationship between the Yankees and New York City, the court
noted several ways in which their relationship was mutually
beneficial.  First, the media’s access to the Clubhouse further
publicized the team and highlighted the personalities of its
players, thus increasing the Yankees’ profits.112  Second, the
publicity and profitability of the Yankees directly correlated to
the annual rent that the city collected.113  In turn, the city
“invested substantial sums of public money to enhance that
drawing power by modernizing and improving the stadium
itself.”114
A typical benefit accruing to a club in a symbiotic relation-
ship analysis is a “favorable lease under which the team keeps
a substantial (if not complete) share of the nontraditional reve-
nues associated with the special features of” the stadium.115
Perhaps just as importantly, a club would receive a substantial
benefit if the government covered much of the stadium’s con-
108 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
109 Id. 87–88.
110 Id. at 93.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 93–94.  “It is an undisputed fact that the City’s profit from its lease
with the Yankees escalates when attendance at Yankee games increases.  Thus
the City has a clear interest in the preservation and maintenance of baseball’s
audience, image, popularity and standing.” Id. at 94.
114 Id.
115 Wasserman, supra note 9, at 544. R
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struction costs.116  In receiving this benefit, clubs can exert a
significant amount of leverage:
Stadiums are built either to keep an existing team from skip-
ping town or to lure a new team into town.  Teams insist they
need these new, publicly funded stadiums to be competitive
on the field and off.  And the situation is so dire, they claim,
that the franchise may be forced to relocate.  Whether teams
actually follow through on that threat, the pain felt by cities
burned by the notorious relocations (Brooklyn and the base-
ball Dodgers, Baltimore and the NFL Colts, and Cleveland
and the NFL Browns) makes the threat real enough.  Given
the scarcity of professional sports franchises, there always is
another community willing to make a play to bring a team
into town by building its own modern stadium.117
Meanwhile, the primary benefit accruing to a city support-
ing a sports club is a substantial economic boost.118  For exam-
ple, Baltimore used a brand-new stadium, Oriole Park at
Camden Yards, to anchor a makeover of its Inner Harbor.119
Oriole Park generates nearly $170 million per year in local
business sales and $18 million per year in total taxes, and
supports nearly 2,500 jobs and $72.6 million in personal in-
come.120  This economic impact is accelerated when the team
performs well on the field.  During their 2014 pennant chase,
the Orioles saw an increase in attendance, sponsorships, and
116 See id. at 545.
117 Id. at 542 (footnotes omitted).  Former Cleveland Browns owner Art Mo-
dell’s decision to move the Browns to Baltimore in 1995 sparked vehement pro-
tests.  Then-Cleveland Mayor Michael R. White put words to just how deeply
Cleveland felt the pain of relocation.  “This community has been wronged. . . .
We’ve loved this franchise for 50 years.  These fans are the most loyal of the most
loyal of the NFL.  And what they got for 50 years of loyalty was a kick in the teeth.”
Steve Rushin, The Heart of a City: Cleveland Won Round 1 in What Will Be an
Agonizing Battle to Hold on to Its Beloved Browns, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 4,
1995), https://www.si.com/vault/1995/12/04/208707/the-heart-of-a-city-
cleveland-won-round-1-in-what-will-be-an-agonizing-battle-to-hold-on-to-its-be-
loved-browns [https://perma.cc/C2CK-DT5P].
118 Wasserman, supra note 9, at 545. R
119 Orioles counsel Alan Rifkin reflected, “The primary argument in favor of an
urban location was that by attracting hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
patrons into the city they in turn would help generate economic activity to hotels,
restaurants, retailers and boost the economic energy of the city.”  Jeff Barker,
Impact of Camden Yards is Debated as it Turns 25, BALT. SUN (Apr. 1, 2017, 10:28
AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-camden-yards-impact-
20170331-story.html [https://perma.cc/JEF4-Z5MQ].
120 CABER, TOWSON UNIV., THE IMPACT OF ORIOLE PARK AT CAMDEN YARDS ON
MARYLAND’S ECONOMY, 2006, at 2 (2007).
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team valuation—thus increasing foot traffic in the Inner Har-
bor and creating new streams of revenue.121
In addition to the stadium’s economic impact, one cannot
overlook “the psychic, symbolic, and cultural benefit to the
community of being a ‘major league city’ and the civic pride and
unity created by luring or keeping a successful team.”122  Al-
though one cannot necessarily quantify civic pride, Camden
Yards is widely renowned as a stadium that transformed base-
ball, and the Orioles are a beloved franchise to the passionate
Baltimore fan base.123  Then-MLB Commissioner Allan H.
“Bud” Selig said:
Building Camden Yards was one of the most important
things that happened to baseball in the last 20 to 25
years . . . .  It changed the whole dynamic.  It led to all these
wonderful stadiums and allowed us to finally market our
sport to its potential—particularly the last five years of ter-
rific growth . . . .  It set it all off.  It never would have hap-
pened without Camden Yards.  But I don’t think anybody
could really have understood how dramatically it was going
to change the face of baseball and the Orioles.124
After nearly six decades playing in front of scarce crowds at
Cleveland Municipal Stadium, the Indians petitioned Cleveland
for a new stadium.  After voters approved a “sin tax” to fund
nearly half of the total cost of construction, Cleveland created
the Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater
121 Scott Dance, Orioles and Sponsors Look to Ride 2014 Success into a New
Season, BALT. SUN (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-
bz-orioles-success-20150411-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS8W-QX8R].
122 Wasserman, supra note 9, at 545. R
123 However, some believe that the city should have spent its money elsewhere.
Louis Miserendino, a visiting fellow at the Maryland Public Policy Institute, re-
marked that, “It’s definitely a beautiful ballpark, . . . but if we want to think of the
ballpark as a tool for reviving the inner city, I think it falls short of that.  If the
stadium was built for that purpose, we were doing something that wasn’t as
effective as other alternatives.”  Peter Schmuck, Camden Yards, the Stadium that
Changed Baseball and Baltimore, Turns 20, BALT. SUN (Mar. 31, 2012, 1:52 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/orioles/bs-sp-orioles-camden-yards-
0401-20120330-story.html [https://perma.cc/5X4A-JX78].  Debate still rages
today about the benefits and consequences of spending significant public funds to
build sports stadiums. See Pat Garofalo & Travis Waldron, If You Build It, They
Might Not Come: The Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-
they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/ [https:/
/perma.cc/6CPA-WVSX]; Elaine S. Povich, Why Should Public Money Be Used to
Build Sports Stadiums?, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 13, 2016 9:47 AM), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/public-money-used-build-sports-stadiums
[https://perma.cc/3VVS-2ZGE].
124 Schmuck, supra note 123. R
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Cleveland (GEDC) to build and operate the stadium.125  The
GEDC is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that owns both Progressive Field
and Quicken Loans Arena and leases them to the Cleveland
Indians and Cleveland Cavaliers, respectively.126  Cleveland
and Cuyahoga County elected officials appoint the GEDC’s
Board of Directors.127
In 1992, the corner of Carnegie and Ontario was cleared for
construction.128  Two years later, the Indians moved in under a
twenty-year lease from the GEDC.129  Immediately thereafter,
the Indians embarked on a period of prolonged success.  Regis-
tering World Series appearances in 1995 and 1997,130 they
attracted thousands of fans to the newly refurbished Gateway
District—in fact, the Indians set a then-MLB record of 455
straight sellouts from June 12, 1995 to April 4, 2001.131  Indi-
ans radio broadcaster Tom Hamilton noted, “No ballpark ever
changed the perception of a city nationally like our park
did . . . .  For so long, Cleveland was a punch line for jokes on
national TV.  A lot of that died out in the 1990s.  It seemed
everyone was feeling better about Cleveland.”132
Here, the Indians appear to have a symbiotic relationship
with Cleveland and Cuyahoga County.  Since moving into “The
Jake” in 1994, the Indians have benefitted greatly from their
partnership with the local government.  For one, they received
a substantial subsidy to build a new stadium—then-owner
Richard Jacobs paid only 52% of the $175 million construction
cost.133  But more importantly, the Indians benefitted from a
renewed enthusiasm amongst fans and significant contribu-
tions from the GEDC for capital repairs.  Bolstered by a unique
combination of a new ballpark, the 1994 baseball strike,134 a
125 Progressive Field, supra note 8. R
126 Who We Are, GATEWAY ECON. DEV. CORP. OF GREATER CLEVELAND, http://
www.gatewaysportscomplex.org/who.html [https://perma.cc/37T7-CELN].
127 Id.
128 Progressive Field, supra note 8. R
129 Id.
130 Postseason Results, CLEVELAND INDIANS, http://cleveland.indians.mlb.com/
cle/history/postseason_results.jsp [https://perma.cc/E6M4-LEC2].
131 Terry Pluto & Tom Hamilton, For Cleveland Indians, Fans and City, Jacobs
Field Was a Whole New Ballgame: ‘Glory Days in Tribe Town’ Excerpts, Part 3,
CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 5, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/pluto/in
dex.ssf/2014/11/for_cleveland_indians_fans_and.html [https://perma.cc/
L4XD-QK8A].
132 Id.
133 Progressive Field, supra note 8. R
134 Indians fans’ enthusiasm was not tempered by the strike:
Tribe fans were so giddy about the new stadium and the young,
gifted team that was emerging, their anger at the 1994 baseball
strike was not aimed at the franchise.  They just wanted baseball
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 25 20-NOV-18 13:36
2018] DON’T TAKE ME OUT TO THAT BALLPARK 1613
bustling Cleveland economy, a mediocre Cavaliers team, and
the Browns’ move to Baltimore, the Indians dominated radio
talk shows and newspaper coverage.135  Soon, they dominated
MLB attendance rankings as well.  As the MLB average game
attendance dropped below 30,000 people from 1995 to 2000,
the Indians average game attendance soared above 40,000.136
As a result, the Indians’ revenue multiplied, giving the front
office the ability to attract and retain marquee players, such as
Jim Thome, Omar Vizquel, Albert Belle, Manny Ramirez, Eddie
Murray, Dave Winfield, and Roberto Alomar.137  Increased rev-
enues resulted in better rosters, more fans, and ultimately,
historic success:138
For more than two decades, the Cleveland Indians lan-
guished at the bottom of the American League.  The team’s
revenues have increased dramatically since the heavily sub-
sidised [sic] Jacobs Field opened.  In 1990[,] the team earned
$34.8 million; in 1997, the team’s earnings had increased to
$134.2 million . . . .  In the same period, the team’s payroll
increased from $19.1 million to $66.9 million . . . .  Increased
revenues and expenditures for players . . . changed Cleveland
from a two-decade loser to an annual competitor for the
American League title.139
Progressive Field has also generated substantial economic
benefits for the city of Cleveland.  An average season generates
nearly $92 million in earnings, $221 million in local business
sales, and $15 million in total taxes, and supports nearly 2,500
jobs.140  The team’s on-the-field success has translated into
back.  They wanted to go to the ballpark.  They believed that this
team would indeed deliver a World Series, and they wanted to watch
it happen.
Pluto & Hamilton, supra note 131. R
135 Id.
136 From 1994 to 1997, the MLB average game attendance was 31,256;
25,022; 26,510; and 28,261, respectively.  In contrast, the Indians average game
attendance was 39,121; 39,483; 41,477; and 42,034, respectively.  Pluto & Ham-
ilton, supra note 131. R
137 Danny Knobler, The Cleveland Indians’ Star-Studded ‘90s MLB Dynasty
That Never Was, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 24, 2016), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/2671087-the-cleveland-indians-star-studded-90s-mlb-dynasty-that-
never-was [https://perma.cc/XZT3-TNCK].
138 See TREVOR SLACK, THE COMMERCIALISATION OF SPORT 113 (2004); see also
Knobler, supra note 137 (“[T]he Indians were among the best teams baseball has R
seen.  They averaged 94 wins a year and nearly six runs a game over a five-year
span.  They had 44 players who made All-Star teams at some point in their
career.”).
139 SLACK, supra note 138, at 109. R
140 GREATER CLEVELAND PARTNERSHIP, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S INVESTMENT 37
(2014), http://council.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_council/en-US/Misc.%20Reports
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economic benefits for the city.  From 1995 to 2012, the Indians
played 34 postseason games at home, generating approxi-
mately $26 million in earnings, $61 million in business sales,
and $5.6 million in taxes.141  Beyond sustained economic im-
pact, the stadium has also elicited pride amongst the local
community—as it was intended to.  In designing the stadium,
HOK Sports Facilities Group worked hard to incorporate ele-
ments unique to Cleveland’s “culture, spirit, and architectural
landscape.”142  For example, the stadium holds a “significant
collection of public art,”143 including a “Who’s on First” display
commemorating the famous “Abbott and Costello” skit.144  The
city also soaked in the team’s success, flocking downtown to
create a captivating atmosphere.145  Cleveland even held a
celebratory parade after losing in one of their World Series
appearances.146  According to star shortstop Omar Vizquel,
“[t]hat [atmosphere] was magical . . . .  It was amazing.  Every
time you came to the park, it was electrifying.”147
The Indians and Cleveland are interconnected in a mutu-
ally-beneficial relationship.  In fact, their relationship has
formed a mutually reinforcing, circular pattern.  When Cleve-
land contributes subsidies to the Indians, the Indians can di-
vert more funds to its on-the-field performance.  When the
Indians perform well on the field, they attract more fans.  When
they attract more fans, the city and local businesses benefit.
Not only are the Indians and the city locked in an inter-depen-
dent relationship, they also depend on each other to send
messages to fans that encourage civic pride and unity.  Just as
the aesthetics of the stadium are uniquely designed to capture
%20and%20Presentations/Sin%20Tax%20Presentations/20140121-GCPExcise
Tax-Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC5L-NDTP].
141 Id.
142 Progressive Field, supra note 8. R
143 Id.
144 See JOSH PAHIGIAN & KEVIN O’CONNELL, ULTIMATE BASEBALL ROAD TRIP: A FAN’S
GUIDE TO MAJOR LEAGUE STADIUMS 237 (2012); see also Marc Bona, ‘Who’s on
First?’ Benches Moved at Progressive Field: 3 Things About the Famous Baseball
Routine, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 27, 2015, 8:00 AM) http://www.cleveland.com/
tribe/index.ssf/2015/04/whos_on_first_benches_moved_at.html [https://
perma.cc/P68C-K3DQ] (“The National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum in
Cooperstown, New York, plays the routine on a continuous loop in its third-floor
home.”).
145 Knobler, supra note 137. R
146 Id.; see also The Associated Press, Baseball: World Series; 50,000 Turn Out
to Cheer Indians, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/
29/sports/baseball-world-series-50000-turn-out-to-cheer-indians.html [https:/
/perma.cc/4ZUR-CCHG] (“While the Indians lost the World Series, you would not
have known it from the reception they got yesterday in Cleveland.”).
147 Knobler, supra note 137. R
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the spirit of Cleveland and evoke civic pride and unity, the
messages that the team posts throughout the stadium are sim-
ilarly designed to channel pride and unity.  For example, the
team might post “This Town is a Tribe Town” to serve as a
rallying cry for fans.  Similarly, the team might post a “smiling”
Chief Wahoo when the team wins, or a “frowning” Chief Wahoo
when the team loses.  In both instances, the team hypotheti-
cally attempts to create a oneness between itself and its fans.
In other words, the team wants the fans to feel that “we win
together, or we lose together.”148  In this way, the Indians and
Cleveland engage in a symbiotic relationship, even in the Indi-
ans’ messaging throughout the stadium.  As such, a court
could find that the Indians are a state actor and that the gov-
ernment speaks through the displays at Progressive Field.
B. Entwinement
A second test that courts apply to find state action is the
entwinement test.  In conducting the entwinement test, a court
asks, “is the private actor so entwined with the government
that the private actor’s conduct takes on a public character?”
Factors that a court may assess include: who actually owns
title to the facility, who provides security resources, and who
maintains control over speech restrictions within the facil-
ity.149  The Supreme Court introduced the entwinement test in
the First Amendment context in Brentwood Academy v. Ten-
nessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.150  In 2001, Brentwood
Academy used the First Amendment to challenge the state ath-
letic association’s anti-recruiting rule.151  At the threshold, the
Court noted that it may find state action if “there is such a
‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that
seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.’”152  The Court then stressed:
What is fairly attributable [to the government] is a matter of
normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity.
From the range of circumstances that could point toward the
148 See Tim Rees, S. Alexander Haslam, Pete Coffee & David Lavallee, A Social
Identity Approach to Sport Psychology: Principles, Practice, and Prospects, 45
SPORTS MED. 1083, 1088 (2015) (“[W]e are more likely to offer help to people we
perceive as belonging to an ingroup that is salient for us, and that we are more
likely to receive help from those who perceive us as belonging to an ingroup that is
salient for them.”).
149 See DeSiato, supra note 9, at 420. R
150 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
151 Id. at 293.
152 Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
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State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a
necessary condition across the board for finding state
action . . . .153
According to the Court, previous cases “have identified a host
of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution.”154
Within this “host of facts,” the Court noted that a “challenged
activity may be state action when it results from the State’s
exercise of ‘coercive power,’ when the State provides ‘significant
encouragement, either overt or covert,’ or when a private actor
operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State
or its agents.’”155
To further clarify the test, the Court distinguished its previ-
ous ruling in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,156
in which it did not find state action, from the situation in Brent-
wood Academy, in which it did.  In Tarkanian, the Court did
not find that the NCAA was a state actor because the NCAA’s
employment policies were shaped by hundreds of universities,
not just the one university implicated in the case.157  In Brent-
wood, the Court did find that the state athletic association was
a state actor because,158 as the Court noted in Tarkanian,
“[t]he situation would, of course, be different if the [associa-
tion’s] membership consisted entirely of institutions located
within the same state.”159  In other words, the state athletic
association was closely linked to, and integrally shaped by, its
various public and private member institutions.  The Court
also found top-down involvement from the state in the athletic
association’s affairs; especially important to the Court, “State
Board members [were] assigned ex officio to serve as members
of the board of control and legislative council.”160
Here, the Cleveland Indians and Cleveland are entwined to
such an extent that a court could find that the Indians are a
state actor.  The Supreme Court introduced the entwinement
test in the First Amendment context sixteen years ago.  The
relationship between the Indians and Cleveland provides an
opportunity for a court to apply the test to a publicly-owned
153 Id.
154 Id. at 296.
155 Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (declining to extend
state action to nursing homes in Medicaid recipients’ claim); Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (extending state action to corporate creditor for
depriving debtor of property without due process)).
156 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
157 Id. at 193.
158 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298.
159 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n.13 (emphasis added).
160 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 300.
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facility leased to a private organization.  In fact, the team and
the city are legally entwined due to the largely overlapping
identity they created—the Gateway Economic Development
Corporation.161
The city also largely influences the Indians’ security and
crowd-control policies.  Not only does the city provide over fifty
police officers outside the stadium before and after the game, it
also provides officers to work alongside stadium ushers.162
Working alongside these ushers, the officers “perform a ‘well-
choreographed bunker maneuver’ to watch the crowd and dis-
suade any misconduct during stoppages in play.”163
[This] present[s] the different case of government lending its
enforcement muscle to assist the private entity in its long-
term and exclusive management and control of government
property.  Pervasive entwinement is present because [the]
government has turned long-term control over its space to
the private entity, then agreed to wield the public power to
enforce those private choices.  The exercise of private power
. . . is a product of public laws and public force.164
By virtue of their overlapping corporate identity, and their col-
laboration in setting and enforcing stadium–security policies,
the Indians and Cleveland are sufficiently entwined for a court
to find that the Indians are a state actor.
State action subsumes the whole of government speech.
Because state action subsumes the whole of government
speech, it follows that the government cannot speak without
acting.  In the publicly owned, privately leased property con-
text, a court analyzes the nature of the relationship between a
public and private entity.  In the blurred public-private speech
sphere that is government speech, we should use state action
principles to determine whether the government is in fact
speaking through a private entity.  If the government could not
act through a private entity, it could not speak either.  If a
government could act through a private entity, it could speak
too.  Here, the Indians and Cleveland hold an interdependent
relationship such that the Indians could qualify as a state actor
when it manages Progressive Field.  If a court could consider
the displays at Progressive Field to be state action, it follows
that the city is intricately associated with whatever speech the
Indians convey through those displays.  In other words, the city
161 Wasserman, supra note 9, at 549. R
162 Id.
163 Id. at 550 (internal quotations omitted).
164 Id.
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speaks through the displays when the Indians speak through
the displays.  Thus, when the Indians post logos of Chief Wa-
hoo throughout Progressive Field, the taxpayers of Cleveland
can assume that the city implicitly endorses or condones such
racially derogatory messaging.
If the Indians are not a state actor, we would consider the
Indians to be a private actor speaking on publicly-owned prop-
erty.  Because the government cannot restrict private speech
on the basis of viewpoint, it could not restrict the Indians’ use
of Chief Wahoo at Progressive Field.
CONCLUSION
Over the past two years, the Cleveland Indians have re-
entered the national spotlight.  Between participating in a
memorable World Series Game Seven, and recording the long-
est winning streak in baseball history,165 the Indians have cap-
tivated the hearts of their faithful followers.  Meanwhile, the
Washington Redskins have continued their own success, at-
tracting sold-out crowds and garnering support for a new, pub-
licly-funded stadium to be constructed by 2027.  Nonetheless,
these storied organizations also remain devoted to long-stand-
ing stereotypes that target Native Americans.  Given the perva-
siveness of these stereotypes in professional sports and the
continued marginalization of Native Americans in the public
consciousness, many community leaders are seeking avenues
for removing the Marks.  Although Matal foreclosed the possi-
bility of revoking these teams’ trademarks, other creative legal
and political avenues still exist.
One potential strategy for placing increased pressure on
the teams is a government regulation restricting the display of
the Marks in the teams’ respective stadiums.  Although courts
have applied different state action tests to professional sports
stadiums, strong precedent exists to demonstrate that a pri-
vate entity’s action within a publicly-owned, publicly-funded
stadium is, in some contexts, state action.  Because state ac-
tion exists when a government leases a ballpark to a private
organization, one could argue that the display of those Marks
represents government speech, and that the government is
thus permitted to remove (what could be construed as) its own
speech from the publicly funded ballpark it owns.
165 Mike Axisa, Roundtable: Do the Indians Already Have the Longest Winning
Streak in MLB History?, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 15, 2017), https://
www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/roundtable-do-the-indians-already-have-the-
longest-winning-streak-in-mlb-history/ [http://perma.cc/9CH2-A8GH].
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Although this legal avenue is complex and unique, it pro-
vides principles for understanding the nexus between state ac-
tion and government speech.  In doing so, it clarifies the line
between government speech and private speech.  It also pro-
vides both real and symbolic tools to pressure both the govern-
ment and teams to restrict the display of offensive stereotypes
towards Native Americans.  Accordingly, this avenue creates
the potential for a new intersection between sports and First
Amendment law that has implications for other unique situa-
tions, such as New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s fight with
Trump Golf Links.166  More importantly, this avenue would be-
gin the process of increasing social awareness towards Native
American communities and the unique challenges they face.
For far too long, the sports world remained blind to how it
perpetuates injustice.  Recent events, such as the NFL National
Anthem protests, have changed that perception in part.  Re-
moving Native American stereotypes from professional sports is
a long-overdue step in the right direction.
166 Ginia Bellafante, Golf Course Deal with Donald Trump Leaves New York
City in the Rough, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/14/nyregion/golf-course-deal-with-donald-trump-leaves-new-york-city-in-
the-rough.html [https://perma.cc/NPR9-36MW].
